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News articles of varying degrees of truthfulness and political alignment, and their influences on
the political opinions of the media consumers are modeled as a Bayesian network incorporating
a mixture of ideas from dual-reasoning models of Motivated Reasoning and Analytic/Intuitive
Reasoning. The result shows that as the media environment moves towards the Post-Truth
world, the problem of political polarization becomes exacerbated.
Introduction
“Fake News” came to the spotlight in a recent surge of
the use of the term. It has been at least partially attributed
to for recent upsets in elections (Rose (2017)), Anti-Vaxxers
and other movements based on false medical information
(Waszak et al. (2018)), and global warming denial (van der
Linden et al. (2017)). Fake News is also blamed for the radi-
calization of fringe movements and the rise of racially and
religiously motivated hate-crimes (Townsend (2017); Her-
mansson (2018)).
In this introductory section, we first will set the scene by
characterizing the recent development of Fake News and the
new media environment. Then, we will cite studies that are
of particular interest to the present study. Finally, we will
give an overview of the plan to model and measure the effect
of the media.
The new media environment
Two features of the new development are of interest to us.
First is the relativization of the concept of Truth. In the post-
truth politics, the line between assertions and emotional fleas
and the truth is blurred. With the advent of the new media
environment, traditional journalists are no longer seen as the
gatekeepers of the fact-based public opinion, and the notion
of Truth has lost its privileged in the media landscape, and
we have seen an increase in media outlets that capitalizes
on various propaganda of questionable truthfulness. (Suiter
(2016), Gorrell et al. (2019)).
Second is the polarization effect. It has long been ob-
served that the advent of the new media environment has
the effect of accelerating the polarization of public opinion
(Spohr (2017)). From the “One-Step flow” point of view that
the news readers exposure to the media directly shape the
news reader’s own opinion (Bennett & Manheim (2006)), as
the political alignment of post-truth media approaches fringe
politics, readers of such news media become more polar-
ized. On top of that, various back-firing effects have been
observed, whereby readers of particular political mindset ex-
ercise Motivated Reasoning in discarding the opposite side
of the story and further reinforces the existing belief.
These two characteristics of the new media have pushed
the political landscape to an alarming level of radicalization,
as observed from various election upsets to the rise of hate
crime and other consequences of the fringe movements. In
this paper, we will model the different media environments
by allocating media consumption to premium centrist media,
premium partisan media and Fake News media. We will dis-
cuss the media environment model in detail in the Methods
section.
Recent studies on political information consump-
tion
We list recent studies to draw inspiration from, to model
the behavior of the media consumers.
Taber et al. (2009) show the effect of dis-confirmation bias
of Motivated Reasoning. The result suggests that, when pro-
cessing political news, readers tend not to exercise the same
level of scrutiny to determine the truthfulness of the news
item.
Pennycook & Rand (2018) found that the ability to tell
factually accurate news from Fake News is positively corre-
lated to the participants’ performance in the Cognitive Re-
flection Test. This result suggests that Motivated Reasoning
alone is not sufficient to account for the discrepancies be-
tween individual media consumer’s ability to single out Fake
News.
Rather than completely replacing the existing observa-
tions on Motivated Reasoning, we will use the result as a
complementary force in determining the probabilistic degree
to which the agent will allow factual inaccuracies, as we shall
see in the following section.
Bail et al. (2018) found evidence for the backfiring effect,
whereby participants who were regularly exposed to the op-
posing views were found to be even more polarized. In this
study, to account for such backfiring, we will count those
that the agent will deem as Fake News to have the opposite
effect. This Fake News backfiring effect, combined with the
Motivated Reasoning phenomena, should be able to account
for the backfiring effect in general. We won’t introduce a
sub-module for backfiring in general, however, as we believe
that Motivated Reasoning + Fake News Backfiring should
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suffice to account for the backfiring results in general, given
the current media environment.
Now that we have examined a couple of recent empirical
studies, we will turn to the theoretical underpinning of the
present study.
Polarization and Bayesian network
Jern et al. (2014) found that Bayesian networks that have
root nodes other than the hypothesis node can capture the po-
larization or convergence effect, where two agents of diverg-
ing effects will either be polarized or converge to the center
after examining the same data point. As we shall see later in
this paper, the topology of the Bayesian network presented in
this paper has the “truth judgment” intervening node that en-
compasses Motivated Reasoning and Fake News Backfiring.
Unlike Jern et al. (2014), however, we use explicit program-
ming constructs available to us in a probabilistic program-
ming language to model the backfiring effect, and we do so
on a continuous distribution. Nevertheless, the basic idea that
the intervening root node in a Bayesian network can account
for polarization remains intact.
Methods
In this section, we explain the design of the model and
give the rationale for design decisions. On the media side,
we will first examine the definition of a news item. Then we
will discuss the abstraction of a media outlet, and we will
finally discuss the media environment. On the agent side, we
will discuss a Bayesian network in which the truthfulness of
a news item is determined by an agent.
News item
A news item has two numerical properties: politics (pn)
and truth (tn).
pn value is centered at 0. The further away from the cen-
ter the politics value is, the more extreme the political align-
ment of the news item is. If the absolute value is close to 1
or above, the politics of the news item is considered pretty
extreme.
tn value is 0 or above. Truth value of 1 or above is con-
sidered factually accurate in every detail. Being true to the
concept of Post-Truth politics, nt is a continuous variable,
rather than a Boolean value.
Media outlet
Each type of media outlet emits a news item of probabilis-
tic politics and truth values. We define three different types
of media outlets and their pn and tn distributions.
Outlet pn tn
Premium Centrist N (0, 0.5) N (0.8, 0.2)
Premium Partisan N (±0.7, 0.3) N (0.8, 0.2)
Fake News Partisan N (±0.9, 0.1) N (0.4, 0.5)
For partisan media outlets, their pn is bi-modal with equal
weight on both sides i.e. for Premium Partisan media:
P (pn | X = 1) ∼ N (0.7, 0.3)
P (pn | X = 0) ∼ N (−0.7, 0.3)
P (X = 0) =P (X = 1) =
1
2
Similarly, Fake News Partisan media is also bi-modal,
with more extreme means.
Media environment
Media environment defines a mixture of media outlets. At
each observation, the media environment makes a weighted
random choice among its mixture of outlet, and let the chosen
outlet to generate a news item. Here are the media environ-
ments and their mixtures:
Media
Environment
Premium
Centrist
Premium
Partisan
Fake News
Partisan
ME1 70% 20% 10%
ME2 40% 50% 10%
ME3 30% 10% 60%
ME1 represents an ideal media environment, with a ma-
jority of centrist media, with a few partisan media outlets
and very few Fake News media. ME2 represents an environ-
ment where media outlets are more opinionated. ME3 rep-
resents a post-truth media environment with an alarmingly
large amount of Fake News circulation. Such shift of media
environments from ME1 to ME3 over time can be attributed
to the economic reality for news media to find an audience
in the increasingly crowded media industry (Bernhardt et al.
(2008); Posner (2005)).
Now we turn to explain how agent processes news items.
Agent model
An agent has two numerical properties: politics (pa) and
analytic (aa). Following Pennycook & Rand (2018), we as-
sign the aa value as an intrinsic property of an agent. While
pa gets updates as the agent processes news items, the ana-
lytic value stays the same throughout the process.
Like news item, the prior distribution of pa of an agent is
centered around 0. The prior distribution is pa ∼ N (0, 1). aa
value is sampled from aa ∼ Uniform (0.5, 1).
Truth and politics judgment by agent
Upon observing a news item, the agent makes a Boolean
decision of whether the news item is true or false. In order to
make the decision, the agent first calculates the motivational
discount dm:
dm = 0.2 · 0.2|pn−pa |
That is, the discount exponentially decays as the pn gets
further away from pa. This reflects the observations of Mo-
tivated Reasoning that agents are less likely to call out Fake
News that are more aligned to their own politics.
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Two variables are sampled:
xn ∼ Uniform (0,min (0, tn))
xa ∼ Uniform (0,min (0, aa − dm))
truth judgment
(
t j ∈ {true, false}
)
is true iff xn > xa:
P
(
t j = true | xn > xa
)
= 1
P
(
t j = true | xn ≤ xa
)
= 0
Politics judgment
(
p j
)
reflects the agent’s perception of
the political effect of the news item. When t j is false, p j is
the reverse of pn.
p j =
{
pn t j is true
−pn t j is false
This formulation reflects the backfiring effect of perceived
Fake News.
Updating pa
p j is the observation value with which pa is updated. The
formulation of the Bayesian update is as following:
P
(
pa | p j
)
∝ P (pa)P
(
p j | pa
)
where the likelihood function P
(
p j | pa
)
is the pdf of dis-
tribution P ∼ N (pa, 0.25)
In summary, Figure 1 shows the model as a Bayesian net-
work.
Implementation of the model
We used Anglican probabilistic programming language
(van de Meent et al. (2018)) to program the model. In
order to obtain the resulting distribution, we have run the
model with Parallel Lighweight Metropolis-Hastings algo-
rithm with 5,000 particles, and obtained the first 200,000 it-
erations and drew the histograms of the results1.
Results
Figures 2 shows Pa distributions after 1, 10 and 100 ob-
servations of news item for given media environments.
ME1 shows a Gaussian distribution of pa after prolonged
exposure to the environment. The strong majority of opin-
ions are formed within a moderate range of the political spec-
trum (i.e. within ±0.5) This is hardly a surprising result given
the majority of the media outlet in ME1 falls under such po-
litical spectrum.
ME2 is a more interesting case. Early distributions af-
ter 1 and 10 observations show a clear bi-modality of the
distribution, which is not surprising given the large portion
of the partisan media. After 100 observations, however, the
Media Environment
Media Outlet
News item politics
pn
New item truth
tn
Agent analytic
aa
Agent politics
pa
Motivational discount
dm
Truth judgment
tj
Politics judgment
pj
Figure 1. Bayesian network depicting the model
distribution looks a lot like ME1 distribution, with a strong
majority opinion formed within a moderate range. From this
result, it stands to reason that media taking editorial stances
on issues are healthy phenomena given that they are factual,
and the overall distribution of the partisan media is equally
distributed on both sides of the argument.
ME3 results show a high degree of polarization in the ex-
treme range of the political spectrum. After 10 observations,
an alarming level of concentration of the opinion is found on
both extremes. This is different from ME1 and ME2 results
where you can still find a strong majority within the moderate
band. This shows the loss of common ground in the public
discourse in a Post-Truth politics. After 100 observations, a
moderate opinion does gain some of the shares back. How-
ever, the majority is opinions are still outside of the moderate
band, with a very high concentration found on each of the
extreme sides.
Overall, the result shows a detrimental effect that Fake
News has on public discourse according to our model. The
result can account for an unusually high level of opinion con-
centration on fringe opinion, and an upsetting result of the
public poll when the proposal is a rather extreme one.
Discussion and Conclusion
The biggest limitation of this study is the lack of any data
fitting in designing the model. Although we did consider em-
pirical results from other studies for inspiration, the model
1 Source code for the model is available at https://gitlab
.com/chajath/polarize-fakenews-model
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itself is largely hand-wired with our subjective view and un-
derstanding of the matter. In order to tune our model to re-
flect the reality better, many of the magic numbers appearing
in our model need to be parameterized:
• prior distribution of pa and aa
• scale and decay rate in dm formulation
• standard deviation in likelihood function
To fit those values, in the future study, we shall gather statis-
tics from existing surveys of the media environment, and
design controlled experiment to determine the parameters
within the model. Finally, another experiment shall be con-
ducted to determine the accuracy of the model compared to
real-world experimental results.
Although the prescriptive analysis was not the main theme
of this study, the study can be further extended to account for
such analysis. The conclusion from studies with a prescrip-
tive focus such as van der Linden et al. (2017) and McClain
(2017) suggest that an antidote to Fake News is the effective
communication of scientific consensus. Given the recurrent
structure of our model, this can be translated to observing
moderate news items with high truth values prior to being
exposed to Fake News items.
In this study, we have essentially abstracted out news
items as two variables: politics and truthfulness. In the future
study, it will be interesting to give a more detailed account of
the semantics of news item. Given the recurrent structure of
the model, it will be natural to extend the model to interface
with other types of Bayesian recurrent neural network (For-
tunato et al. (2017)) that focuses on natural language process-
ing. Doing so will allow us to train the model from primary
sources of the data, namely the news items themselves.
What we have presented here is a way to model the behav-
ior of individual news-consuming agents. Given the advent
of personal media and the prevalence of social media, it will
be interesting to devise a multi-agent model (following Ay-
manns et al. (2017)) where the interaction between the agents
are modeled after social networks, with varying degrees of
reaches and influences from multiple individuals.
The present study showcases an interesting use of prob-
abilistic programming to model complex social phenomena
from the cognitive perspective of individual agents. Future
work ideas discussed in this section will further the use of
probabilistic programming and other computational cogni-
tive methods in the realms of computational social sciences.
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Figure 2. Political Opinion after observations. From left: ME1, ME2 and ME3. From top to bottom: 1, 10 and 100 observations.
